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… the range of economic activity that can be effectively coordinated across a complex 
multifirm supply chain is just starting to be explored by companies and those who do 
research on these subjects. The boundaries of the firm, transaction costs, supply chain 
architecture and coordination, and outsourcing are all facets of a large mosaic in which 
incentives, communication and coordination, and the boundaries of the firm are worked 
out. The outsourcing extends to the employment relationship, where again the relative 
costs of inhouse and the outsourced resources may have shifted. I hasten to add that these 
issues are far from being settled in the world of practice and the world of economic 
research. 
 
(Michael Spence, 2002, p456) 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Fiercer global competition, rapid technological change, and choosier customers are 
forcing firms to seek more efficient production and distribution structures. In recent 
years, industries have shown increasing collaboration on issues of product development, 
quality guarantee systems and improved logistics. Spot markets are being replaced by 
contract-production and systems of vertical coordination. More coordination and 
collaboration may lead to improved efficiency in production and distribution channels 
and to more product and market innovations. These vertical relationships can take many 
forms, like strategic alliances, long-term contracts, licensing, subcontracting, joint 
ventures, franchising, cooperatives, and networks. The importance of these developments 
is not only witnessed by the focus of this journal (Omta, e.a., 2001), but also by the above 
citation from the most recent Nobel Prize lecture. 
Many stakeholders are involved in chains and networks, like employers and 
employees in the various stages, consumers, capital providers, insurance companies, 
governmental agencies, and so on. They have conflicting as well as joint interests. 
Governance is about the organization of their transactions, while a governance structure 
consists of a collection of rules / institutions / constraints structuring the transactions 
between the various stakeholders. Examples are the allocation of property rights (chain 
and network directorship), the capital structure, the reward system, the board of directors, 
public codes and regulations, the pressure of large investors, the competition in the 
product and labor market, the organizational structure, the accounting system, and so on. 
These aspects of governance structure have a large impact on the flow of formal and 
informal information, the bringing to value of asymmetric information, and the structure 
and impact of formal (hard) and relational (soft) contracts.  
Governance matters because contracts are in general incomplete. Contractual 
incompleteness is due to the impossibility to specify everything ex ante. There is only a role 
for a governance structure ex post, when it is costly to design contracts based on observable 
future variables. If certain aspects are therefore unspecified, then there will be ex post a 
quasi-surplus which has to be divided and ex ante investment decisions will determine the 
size of the quasi-surplus. A governance structure affects the size of the surplus that will be 
generated by its effects on investments, the efficiency of bargaining, and risk-aversion 
(Zingales, 1998).  
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The aim of the research agenda ‘Governance of Chains and Networks’ is to describe 
and explain governance choices in chains and networks and how they affect the behavior 
of the parties involved. Four themes are distinguished. Section 2 deals with the 
assignment of decision rights in the form of authority and responsibility, where decision 
rights concern all rights / rules regarding the deployment and use of assets (Hansmann, 
1996). Section 3 addresses income rights by way of the remuneration of the various 
stakeholders in chains and networks, where income rights are rights to receive the 
benefits and obligations to pay the costs that are associated with the use of an asset. 
Research regarding these two themes entails investigating the trade-offs involved in 
changing governance structures with respect to the distribution of revenues and costs as 
well as the allocation of authority / power. Section 4 focuses on alignment. The 
distinction between the previous two research themes and alignment is that the former is 
concerned with issues regarding opposing interests, while the latter is focused on joint 
interests. Section 5 highlights limited cognitive capacities in relation to governance. The 
three previous themes have paid some attention to this theme, but this has hardly been 
made explicit. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Governance and decision rights 
 
Coase (1937) asked the question: ‘What is a firm?’. This question is not trivial 
because everything that can be produced in the entire society can in principle also be 
produced by one centrally planned organization. Coase proposed a distinction between 
transaction modes ‘internal’ and ‘external’ to the firm. There are costs in maintaining a 
continuous presence in markets and engaging in spot transactions, while internal 
transactions entail bureaucratic costs. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) have challenged this 
distinction by posing the question what the difference is between a customer firing his 
grocer and an employer firing an employee. Subsequent developments, like Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and Hart and Moore (1990), have mainly taken this route in analyzing 
governance structure choice. Empirical support for the importance of property rights is 
provided by Johnson, e.a. (2002). The next subtheme formulate research questions along 
this line of inquiry. The distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ transaction modes 
has been carried forward by Simon (1951) and Williamson (1985). The next two 
subthemes build on this distinction.  
 
2.1 Formal versus real authority 
An incomplete contract is completed by allocating authority to somebody. This 
person decides, according to his own interest, what is most desirable in the prevailing 
circumstances. A central issue regarding governance is therefore the ‘make or not-make 
decision’. The theory of the firm, e.g. transaction costs economics and property rights 
theory, is concerned with intermediate products, i.e. vertical relationships. The ‘make-or-
not-make’ decision boils down to the ‘make-or-buy’ decision. An important issue in 
organizing the firm is therefore the allocation of control and authority, i.e. chain 
directorship. This allocation involves inevitable trade-offs in the choice of governance 
structure, because moving authority downward in a chain or network entails taking power 
away upstream (Hendrikse and Bijman, 2002a). Related issues arise regarding the 
allocation of decision rights in joint ventures and public-private partnerships.  
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There are a number of other research questions. Standard incomplete contracting 
indicates that the employee should be the owner of the assets when the relationship 
specific investments of the employee are most important (Hart and Moore, 1990). 
However, this seems to be at odds with a basic feature of the firm. Crucial to the notion 
of the firm is the centralization of decision making power, i.e. the employer, not the 
employee, is the owner of the firm. This seems problematic from an efficiency 
perspective when the relationship specific investments of the employee are most 
important. Rajan and Zingales (1998) have formulated a solution by distinguishing 
ownership and access to assets, where ownership resides at the top and access to an agent 
is allowed or not. The efficient design of access to and in chains and networks is a major 
challenge. 
Another way out of this problem (of the centralization of formal authority) is to 
view ownership as more than a simple (non-contingent) long-term contract allocating 
decision rights. Formal authority does not preclude that control is delegated to another 
party, e.g. the employee or a professional management. Formal authority resides at the 
top, whereas informal authority can be either centralized or decentralized. So, the 
efficiency of a relationship may be enhanced by giving up some control, i.e. giving real 
authority away, even though the formal control stays at the top (Aghion and Tirole 
(1997), Baker, e.a., (1999 and 2002)). These ideas regarding contingent decision rights 
are not only implemented in function and task design, but also in the allocation of 
decision authority in the design of financial instruments (Aghion and Bolton, 1992). 
 
2.2 Relational contracts 
Relationships within firms are rarely mediated by explicit contacts alone. The 
incompleteness of contracts implies that formal authority can only be allocated to a 
limited extent. Informal aspects of organizations have to be considered together with the 
formal aspects in the design of governance structures. Informal means of enforcing 
contracts are therefore also needed, like implicit contracts. The role of implicit / relational 
contracts is to utilize the parties’ detailed knowledge of their situation to adapt to new 
contingencies as they arise. 
The rules embedding transactions can therefore be formal as well as informal. The 
formal rules are represented by the (allocation of) decision rights of an incomplete contract, 
while the informal rules are captured by an implicit / relational contract. The performance of 
formal organisational structures and institutions depends importantly on the informal 
relationships that these structures and institutions facilitate, where the informal rules serve to 
complete the incomplete contract. Implicit / relational contracts, i.e. credible informal 
agreements, have to be designed in such a way that the reputation of each party is 
sufficiently important to adhere to the informal agreement in order to bring detailed 
knowledge to value. The allocation of formal rights determines not only the identity of the 
party developing a reputation, but also the costs and benefits of adhering to an informal 
contract. 
Hybrid organisations, like networks, franchises, partnerships, intermediaries, sub-
contracting, distribution channels, collective trademarks, alliances, … , are often 
described as long-term relationships involving trust. The implicit implication is that trust 
seems to be occurring only in these governance structures. However, relationships in 
vertically integrated structures are usually also characterised by a long-term relationship. 
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Trust plays therefore an important feature in the employer – employee relationship as 
well. The asymmetric treatment of long-term relationships seems therefore ad hoc, i.e. the 
difference between trust in ‘internal’ versus ‘external’ transaction modes is not well 
understood. 
 
2.3 Conflict resolution 
Compensating for the incompleteness of contracts, a governance structure is designed 
to foster efficiency in transacting by deterring one party from appropriating the other, 
coordinating exchange, and resolving disputes which are due to differences in judgments 
(partly motivated by differences in objectives). In the absence of well functioning legal 
institutions or vertical integration, other means of enforcing contracts are needed, either 
formal or informal. The standard modelling of relational contracts uses the Folk theorem of 
the theory of repeated games. Relational contracts are sustained by reciprocity, i.e. bad 
behavior today will punished tomorrow by ending the relationship. However, are 
punishments as unforgiving as depicted by this approach? Are there other means of 
enforcing relational contracts which support the stability of these governance structures? 
Empirical work by McMillan and Woodruff (1999) suggests that a much richer variety of 
means is used to sustain relational contracts, where network features play an important role. 
 
3 Governance and income rights 
 
The desirability and stability of a chain or network is determined by its participants 
and the incentives for good performance facing them. There are many causes (and 
solutions) for possible frictions in these organizations. A party becomes a member of a 
certain chain or network when it is in its own interests, which is determined by the other 
participants, the possible choices, the available information, and the distribution of costs 
and revenue schemes. This raises issues regarding optimal cost sharing schemes, 
monitoring rules, self-selection devices, and enforcement considerations in chains and 
networks. Payments are structured in a way to reduce the conflict of interests between the 
parties, and extra information is being gathered and used to reduce the information 
asymmetry. The costs of asymmetric information are for example dealt with by other 
payoff schemes, or another allocation of tasks. A complete contracting perspective seems 
to be most appropriate in order to deal with conflicting interests and asymmetric 
information (Hendrikse, 2003). 
 
3.1 More than 2 parties 
Traditional analysis of vertical relationships consider usually only two parties. A 
chain consists of at least three parties, i.e. there is at least one party in the middle. This 
party is a buyer of the upstream product / service, while being a seller to the downstream 
party at the same time. A network is even more complicated because it consists of a chain 
together with the interdependent relationships surrounding it. This multi party nature of 
chains and networks raises several issues which are absent in a two party relationship, 
e.g. the power of the party in the middle, the party in the middle is agent as well as 
principal at the same time, the stability of contractual arrangements between two 
adjacent parties (Tirole, 1986), and the intensity of incentives (Dixit, 1997). 
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3.2 Competition 
Standard economic theory predicts the convergence of governance structures over 
time, i.e. the selection process of the market winnows out the efficient governance 
structure. However, many sectors exhibit a variety of governance structures over 
substantial periods of time, e.g. co-operatives as well as stock-listed companies have 
substantial market shares in many agricultural markets (Hendrikse, 1998)). Does the 
market not perform its selection function well, or are certain value enhancing services / 
functions provided by the competition between various governance structures at the same 
time? Hendrikse and Bijman (2002b) address the forces of self-selection and 
countervailing power, while Rajan and Zingales (2000) focus on building sustainable 
competitive advantage by building a network of complementarities with limited access 
for outside parties. 
Each stage in the production chain is also part of a specific sector / industry, i.e. 
horizontal considerations have an impact on the chain. The ‘make-or-not-make’ decision 
boils down to the ‘make-or-compete’ decision. The field of industrial organisation 
focuses on this topic, with considerations like economies of scale, barriers to entry, 
innovation, and the intensity of the competitive process. 
 
4 Governance and alignment 
 
People / firms take specific courses of action in order to do specialized work and 
use tools that are geared towards their task. This is attractive from a productivity 
perspective, but specialization entails also problems, like providing the right incentives 
and establishing coordination. This may frustrate the potential productivity gains. 
Specialization has to be accompanied by alignment in order to establish coordination and 
complementary between chain and network activities. 
 
4.1 Coordination 
Chain and network parties are regularly confronted with exceptional or unclear 
situations, in which the desirable course of action is not immediately clear from the 
perspective of the whole chain or network. Coordination problems are situations in which 
one does not know which decision aligns best with other decisions in the chain or 
network. 
Various solutions for coordination problems have been formulated in a two party 
context, like setting prices or quantities (income rights), organization / centralization 
(decision rights), regular meetings, installing information and communication 
technologies. Coordination problems are much more challenging when three or more 
parties are involved. It seems that especially the performance on the criteria robustness 
and simplicity (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992) will be affected in a major way by the 
change to three or more parties, which will probably have implications for the desirability 
of the various coordination devices. 
 
4.2 Complementarity 
The transformation of chains and networks has implications for work practices, 
strategy, products and services, supplier and customer relationships. The fit between 
organizational, accounting, communication, financial, production, logistics and marketing 
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attributes of chains and networks becomes important. Increasing synergies between 
production, distribution and marketing among firms will have an impact on the 
investment decisions of each party. Investments in one tier of the chain or network must 
be coordinated with investments in other tiers to obtain optimal performance. As there are 
complementarities among the activities of different chain participants, the governance of 
these relationships matters. 
Issues in governance have traditionally been concerned with the provision of 
investment incentives and the resolution of hold-up problems. However, the allocation of 
authority is not only determined by the need to provide investment incentives, and 
incentives for investment are provided by a variety of means, of which ownership is just 
one. A richer approach considers various instruments, which requires a system of 
attributes perspective (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). The crucial concept regarding the 
relationship between the various instruments is complementarity. It gears the attention 
towards the interdependencies between these various attributes of chains and networks, 
and results in the identification of combinations of these attributes which are viable. This 
raises a number of issues.  
First, the contracting externalities between the various instruments guiding these 
attributes have to be considered (Holmstrom and Roberts, 1991 and 1994). This breaks 
the symmetric treatment of intra- and inter organisational relationships, i.e. internal 
organisations are a world on their own. Chains and networks have therefore probably 
their own logic. Second, system innovation becomes a major issue. Solow (1987) 
observed about the introduction of new information technologies that ‘You can see the 
computer age everywhere except in the productivity statistics’. Brynjolfsson and Hitt 
(2002) show that substantial productivity increases emerge once the adoption of new 
information technologies is accompanied by changes in supplier relationships, customer 
relationships, work practices, strategy, and products and services. 
Third, a complementarity perspective has implications for the pace of change. It 
advocates ‘all-or-nothing’ (Big Bang) change, but gradual change is often observed. It is 
not clear what is most desirable (Dewatripont and Roland, 1992). Finally, although all 
attributes of a chain or network matter, it is usually a specific attribute, e.g. transparency, 
complexity or governance, driving the choice of the other attributes in order bring the 
various complementarities in the system to value. The specific chain / network has to 
indicate which of these aspects is most important. For example, the specificity of 
investments seems to be the driving attribute in the organization of fruit and vegetable 
chains, whereas it is not in the organization of the flower chain. 
 
5 Governance and cognition 
 
The impact of cognitive capabilities and perceptions of the various chain and network 
participants on the choice of governance structure are now highlighted. 
 
5.1 Complexity 
Transaction costs economics has stressed the role of governance structures in 
alleviating the ex ante as well as ex post problems associated with asset specificity. 
Incomplete contracting theory focuses on ex ante investment incentives because almost 
all ex post problems are anticipated, i.e. contractual incompleteness is not endogenous in 
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the theory. The problems associated with asset specificity are driving the analysis. 
However, many problems are so complex that only a limited number of problems and 
choices can be anticipated ex ante. Complexity rather than asset specificity may therefore 
guide the choice of governance structure. A shift in attention towards ex post instead of 
ex ante incentive problems will have repercussions for the efficient choice of governance 
structure (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001). 
A second complexity issue regarding governance concerns the classic ‘make or not-
make’ decision. Many organisations are involved in activities which have very limited 
vertical or horizontal interactions with the activities of a specific network. The ‘make-or-
not-make’ decision boils down to the ‘make-or-abandon’ decision. This is the topic of 
diversification. Diversification or divestiture decisions entail that somehow a new 
internal organisational equilibrium is preferred above the current one. However, the 
considerations driving these decisions have not been formulated in coherent framework 
which addresses the efficient scope of the organisation, and therefore the chain and 
network. 
Third, traditional analysis of vertical relationships consider usually only two parties. 
Chain and network analyses is geared towards situations consisting of at least three 
parties. The number of possible interactions increases exponentially when the number of 
parties increases, which raises issues regarding the span of control, decay in quality of 
information transmission when more parties are involved or parties, and the efficient 
boundaries of a network. 
 
5.2 Form follows function 
A well known insight from evolutionary biology is that ‘Form follows function’, i.e. 
the design of a specie evolves in such a way that it is fit for the environment in which it 
has to survive (Cosmides and Tooby, 1994). An example in the field of management is 
the observation by Chandler (1962) that ‘Structure follows Strategy’, inspired by the 
evolution of the multidivisional form at General Motors. However, a lot of research takes 
as it starting point the reverse sequence, i.e. the governance structure is chosen first, 
investment decisions are taken subsequently. The same topic is relevant for the 
governance of chains and networks. 
 
5.3 Inertia regarding change 
Organizational change is a recurring phenomenon. Popular press accounts report 
frequently about mergers, divestitures, replacements of CEO's, organizational restructu-
ring, and so on. A puzzling feature of these organizational changes is the timing of its 
implementation. It is observed that there are many situations in which considerable delay 
occurs in actually implementing a desirable organizational change. Another puzzling 
aspect regarding organizational and governance change is that it occurs regularly that all 
the involved parties acknowledge after the implementation that everybody knew already 
that something had to be changed. A third aspect of organizational change is that the 
involved parties may have vested interests. It boils down to questions like: Are certain 
governance structures more inert to change than others?, Is there a life cycle of a 
governance structure?, and so on. 
Problems of cognition and learning play an important role in these inertial aspects 
of the change of governance structure. Governance structures regarding chains and 
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networks channel the data perceived and the way they are made meaningful by agents. 
This buffers and constrains the diverse and variable actions of many agents (Hodgson, 
1998). The relevance of these considerations is reflected in the switch from so called 
‘supply chain management’ to ‘demand oriented chains and networks’.  
 
6 Summary and conclusion 
 
The research agenda presented in this article has formulated the relevance of 
governance for the emerging field of Chain and Network Science. The themes decision 
rights, income rights, alignment and cognition are distinguished. It entails research questions 
like: 
- How does efficient chain directorship reflect technological and demand 
developments? 
- Is detailed local knowledge best brought to value by granting access or by 
delegating authority? 
- How are relational contracts enforced? 
- Does the intensity of incentives decrease when the number of chain and network 
participants increase? 
- Why do different governance structures coexist in the same industry? 
- Which coordination mechanisms are used in chains and networks, and why? 
- Which principle drives the coherence in chains and networks? 
- Is Big-Bang system innovation desirable? 
- Does complexity or asset specificity drive the choice of governance structure? 
- Are governance aspects the driving force behind change in chains and networks? 
- Are there path dependencies in the choice of governance structure? 
 
Making progress regarding these themes and research questions entails establishing a 
number of insights which may turn CNS into a scientific field of inquiry, with its own 
concepts and tools. This requires not only developing these concepts with input disciplines 
like economics and management, social sciences, information sciences, technological 
sciences, cognitive sciences, and law, but also to develop chain and network specific 
methodologies and tools together with chain and network parties. The combination of 
developing concepts jointly with enterprises is potentially very fruitful, which was 
already recognised by Koopmans (1957, p145) when he wrote ‘The task of linking 
concepts with observations demands a great deal of detailed knowledge of the realities of 
economic life’. 
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